Wardner Peak Avalanche Accident

Overview

On January 7th, 2020 seven skiers were caught in two back-to-back avalanches at Silver

Mountain Resort outside of Kellogg, Idaho. Two skiers were partially buried, five were fully

buried, and three were killed. This accident occurred on an open ski run (Figure 1).

Ski area avalanche accidents are complicated by the potential for multiple burials and many

witnesses providing conflicting information. Our goal in this report is to present the facts

surrounding the accident and subsequent rescue. Excellent firsthand accounts exist and can be

accessed by contacting the National Avalanche Center at nac@avalanche.org.

Avalanche Details

The avalanches occurred on '16 to 1', a northeast facing slope on Wardner Peak at ~6000 feet

in elevation (Figure 2). We do not know much about the first avalanche because the second

avalanche was much larger and overran the initial crown and debris (Figure 3). The second

avalanche fractured on a weak layer of surface hoar buried near the ground. The first avalanche

caught seven skiers and ran approximately 500 vertical feet. The larger, second slide

(AS-SS-R3-D3-O) ran ~900 vertical feet and overran the buried and partially buried skiers. The

crown of this avalanche was approximately 30 inches deep and 500 feet wide, with a slope

angle of 35 degrees. The alpha angle was 21 degrees.

The '16 to 1' avalanches were connected to another avalanche on the Morning Star ski run by

cracks between avalanche crowns (Figure 2). We are not sure when the Morning Star

avalanche released, but the snowpack between these two ski runs did not avalanche. The

Morning Star crown was on a 33 degree slope, the face of the crown was 18-30 inches deep,

~200 feet wide, and ran ~250 vertical feet. To our knowledge, the Morning Star avalanche did

not involve any people.

The Silver Mountain Ski Patrol conducted avalanche mitigation work with explosives on the

upper portion of Wardner Peak prior to opening '16 to 1' for the day. These efforts did not trigger

avalanches on '16 to 1', Morning Star, or other ski area terrain on Wardner Peak.

Snowpack and Weather

On the day of the accident, backcountry avalanche danger was HIGH and the Idaho Panhandle

Avalanche Center (IPAC) issued an Avalanche Warning for the surrounding area. Backcountry

avalanche warnings and forecasts do not cover operating ski areas, but because '16 to 1' had

been previously closed to skiing for the season, the forecast does provide a general sense of

the day's conditions.

In essence, the elevated backcountry avalanche danger resulted from a patchwork of old snow

left on shady slopes above 5800 feet in elevation. Extended clear and cold weather at the end

of November turned this snow into weak, poorly-bonded faceted crystals, and a storm in

mid-December capped and preserved it. Subsequent periods of light snowfall and clear, cold

weather created additional weak layers. Larger storms in early January buried these weak

layers, doubling the snow depth in the region between January 1 and January 8th (Figure 4).

The largest of these Pacific storms arrived on January 6th. Natural Resources Conservation

Service data from the Sunset (5540 ft, 15 miles to the NE) and Lookout (5190 ft, 20.5 miles to

the E) SNOTEL stations suggest the storm dropped 15 to 20 inches of new snow in 24 hours

(Figure 4). Strong winds and temperatures in the 20s F characterized much of the storm, but

temperatures rose to near freezing the morning of the avalanche.

IPAC observed a snow profile in the crown of the '16 to 1' avalanche two days after the slides

(Figure 5). During those two days, approximately 10-12 inches of additional snow fell. The

ground cover in that area is talus, and depth hoar and basal facets made up the bottom third of

the snowpack. Also within that bottom third of the snowpack was a thin rain crust and a buried

surface hoar layer (Figure 6). Stability tests suggest that the surface hoar likely failed initially,

resulting in the avalanches. The middle of the snowpack consisted of several layers of relatively

soft snow, and the upper 20+ inches were new snow from the January 6-8 storm.

Accident Summary

The accident occured on a ski run called '16 to 1'. This run spans much of the northeasterly

aspect of Wardner Peak. This area was opened to public skiers for the first time of the season

on January 7th. There are two ways skiers can access '16 to 1': across a mid-slope traverse, or

via a hiking route to the top of Wardner Peak (Figure 7).

On January 7th, the Silver Mountain Ski Patrol kept the area closed until just before 11:00 AM.

Upon opening the terrain, several groups began side-stepping along the traverse and hiking to

the ridge. Witnesses recall that the traverse was not yet established. As a result, the lead skier

was breaking trail and moving slowly; at one point, at least 10 people were backed up along the

traverse. Several riders skied downhill from the traverse, leaving seven skiers in the group

approaching '16 to 1'. At approximately 11:00 AM, the leading skiers made it out of the trees and

continued to cut the traverse while others in the group were descending, or preparing to

descend. Witnesses report that there were no tracks on the slope at this time. The order of the

seven skiers (from front to back of the line) is as follows: 1. Warren Keyes, 2. Carl Humphries, 3.

William Fuzak, 4. Ken Scott, 5. Rebecca Hurlen-Patano, 6. Scott Parsons, and 7. Molly

Hubbard. Figure 8 is a likely reconstruction of their order and placement immediately prior to the

accident.

The first avalanche broke a short distance above the seven skiers and ran 500-600 vertical feet

(Figure 2). Rebecca and Warren were left partially buried and were able to look around, connect

verbally, and begin to extricate themselves. Rebecca also remembers seeing Scott’s arm and

pole above her (on the slope) and Bill’s helmet below. Bill remembers punching his fist up to the

surface as the slide stopped and waving in hopes that someone would see him. Ken remembers

being able to see light and could move his right hand enough to clear snow from his face. We

don't know what Carl, Scott and Molly experienced during this time. Based on a 911 link from

Carl’s phone, it is likely that he was partially buried and was able to dial or voice activate the

call, but there is no record of Carl talking to dispatch. Based on Molly’s final location in the

debris, it is likely that she skied the skiers right treeline and was struck by the first avalanche as

she traversed left across the bottom of '16 to 1'.

Rebecca was able to free herself and crawl to Bill. Warren worked for a minute or two to dig out

his skis and was close to being free of the debris. At this point, all four skiers remember a loud

rumbling and shaking sensation immediately prior to being overrun by the second avalanche.

The second slide was larger than the first. A witness on the traverse described it this way: “The

visibility was poor, foggy and snowing -- I was watching a narrow runnel of snow (kind-of like a

sluff) moving downslope just past the treeline when the entire mountain started to move … I’ve

never seen anything like it … it was loud, 4-6 feet deep … snow moving as far as I could see

across the slope.” As the second avalanche overran the seven skiers, Warren was further

buried up to his armpits, Rebecca was carried another 25-30 feet downslope and again left

partially buried, and Scott, Ken, Bill, Carl, and Molly were further buried under a significant

amount of debris. Figure 9 depicts their final placement.

The second avalanche clearly involved snow above the first slide, but it is not clear if it was

triggered from the traverse, from somewhere farther up the peak, or if the remaining slab failed

naturally on its own. Skiers coming from the top of the run via the hiking route describe skiing

over a large crown and onto the bed surface after the two slides occurred (Figure 10).

Rescue Summary

A search was started immediately by those on scene. Several bystanders called 911 (shortly

after 11am), and more than one individual skied to the closest lift and notified the operator, who

in turn called the ski patrol. Rebecca was able to extricate herself. Warren was stuck for 20-30

minutes and needed bystanders’ help to get out. Scott, Ken, Bill, Carl and Molly were not

visible.

At approximately 11:05 AM, the Silver Mountain Ski Patrol was notified of the avalanche and

responded. All witnesses described a chaotic scene. The debris field was extensive, and the

rescuers were unsure how many people were buried. Over the next hour, the rescuers found

three buried skiers (Figure 9), two of whom survived the ordeal. Bill Fuzak was found with a

hasty probe strike approximately 40 minutes after the avalanche. He was buried approximately

7 feet deep and survived. Carl Humphreys was found with a probe strike approximately 45

minutes after the avalanche. He was buried approximately 9 feet deep and did not survive. Ken

Scott was found with a probe strike approximately 55 minutes after the avalanche. He was

buried approximately 9 feet deep and survived. Rebecca’s recollection of at least two of the

partial burial locations (after the initial slide and before the second) allowed rescuers to focus

their search and probably contributed significantly to Bill and Ken’s rescue.

Scott Parsons was found at 6:30 PM by a rescue dog alert and subsequent probe strike. He

was buried 12 feet deep and did not survive. At that time, no other people were reported

missing. Early the next morning (January 8th), Molly Hubbard's father called the Silver Mountain

Ski Patrol and reported he had not heard from his daughter. Her van was located in the parking

lot, and the search resumed.

On January 8th, professional rescuers searched the area with a handheld RECCO search

device (from Schweitzer Resort) but did not receive a positive signal. At around 4:00 PM,

Federal resources reported that Molly’s phone data indicated she was located in the

Morningstar avalanche debris. The rescue team used this information to move the focus of the

search, but the phone location data proved to be inaccurate. That evening, an Incident

Command System (ICS) was enacted and additional resources were organized for the next

morning.

Two Bear Air, a helicopter rescue operation, arrived at first light on January 9th (Figure 16).

Their helicopter mounted RECCO SAR detector narrowed the search to a 30 foot by 30 foot

area in the '16 to 1' debris. Rescue dog teams indicated the presence of human scent in this

area. The inability of either RECCO units or avalanche dogs to pinpoint a location suggested a

deep burial scenario. Rescuers began a sequence of fine probing, strategic stripping of snow

with a snowcat, and additional fine probing and dog work (Figure 16) . It took three sequences

to locate Molly Hubbard at around 12:30 PM. She was equipped with RECCO reflectors in both

her jacket and her pants. She was buried 21 feet deep and did not survive.

Figures 11-17 depict the rescue.

Comments

Fatal avalanche accidents are tragic events. We describe them to help the people involved and

the community as a whole to better understand them. We offer these comments in the hope that

they will help people avoid future avalanche accidents. We do not intend to place blame on any

of the involved parties or imply that any particular action or decision would have prevented this

tragic event.

The rescue involved many people and resources and several lives were saved. Members of the

community, Silver Mountain employees, Schweitzer Mountain Ski Area Employees, Shoshone

County Sheriff and Fire, local Search and Rescue groups, and many more helped in the rescue

effort.

Things to consider:

● In-bounds avalanches: Avalanche accidents inside operating ski areas are rare. When

they do occur, it is difficult to quickly determine the number of people involved and/or

missing.

● Consequences: The avalanche(s) flowed into a small gully, or ‘terrain trap’, at the base

of the run. This resulted in deep burials which complicated an already challenging rescue

scenario.

● Searchability: Carrying avalanche transceivers and RECCO reflectors increases your

chance of being quickly located if you are buried by an avalanche.

● Education: Avalanche education and awareness played an important and positive role in

this event. Previous avalanche education and training was apparent in those caught in

the avalanche, the people notifying the ski patrol, those initiating the hasty search, and

the volunteers serving on probe lines.

This report is a cooperative effort between Jeff Thompson of the Idaho Panhandle Avalanche

Center and Simon Trautman of the US Forest Service National Avalanche Center. Silver

Mountain Resort provided information and access to the accident site. Survivors and

bystanders provided first hand accounts and perspective. Thanks to the rescuers and to those

who helped with this report. Our heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the people

lost in this event. Please direct questions to nac@avalanche.org.